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I. INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."' The United States
Supreme Court has "construed this to mean that in federal courts
counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel un-
less the right is competently and intelligently waived." 2 Thus, the
sixth amendment operates to ensure that a defendant's constitution-
ally mandated rights are protected in actions by the state against the
criminal defendant. In order to provide a criminal defendant with
counsel, the Court has recognized the inherent power of a federal
court to appoint counsel.3
While the Constitution and the Supreme Court have squarely faced
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
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the question of a criminal defendant's right to counsel and the inher-
ent power of federal courts to appoint such counsel, the right of an
indigent civil litigant is not so clearly defined. This Note examines the
Supreme Court's recent attempt in Mallard v. United States District
Court 4 to answer the question whether a federal court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d), may compel an unwilling attorney to represent an
indigent civil litigant. Following an examination of the Court's opin-
ion in Mallard, the discussion will focus on the questions the Court
left unanswered. While the Court was faced with the opportunity to
resolve the question of mandatory appointments of counsel for indi-
gent civil litigants, it instead chose to step out of harm's way, leaving
unanswered questions whose resolutions are needed today.
II. MALLARD: DEFINING THE WORD "REQUEST"
In Mallard, the Supreme Court was asked to decide "whether 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes a federal court to require an unwilling at-
torney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case." 5 Section
1915(d) provides that "[t]he court may request an attorney to repre-
sent any [person claiming in forma pauperis status] unable to employ
counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."6 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph
Printing,7 directed that "the chief judge of each district... seek the
cooperation of the bar associations and the federal practice commit-
tees of the judge's district to obtain a sufficient list of attorneys prac-
ticing throughout the district so as to supply the court with competent
attorneys who will serve in pro bono situations."8
In response to the Eighth Circuit's directive, the District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa prepared and maintained a list of attor-
neys in good standing admitted to practice before the district court.9
Attorneys are assigned to cases in the district according to the follow-
ing procedure. Once the district court determines that an indigent
party qualifies for representation under section 1915(d), a copy of the
case file is forwarded to the Volunteer Lawyer Project ("VLP").o Us-
ing the list of available attorneys prepared by the district court, VLP
selects an attorney for section 1915(d) appointments. 1 An attorney
4. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
5. Id. at 1816.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1988).
7. 728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984).
8. Id. at 1005.
9. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989).
10. The Volunteer Lawyers' Project is a joint venture of the Iowa State Bar Associa-
tion and the Legal Services Corporation of Iowa.
11. In February of 1986, the Iowa State Bar Association sent a letter to all
lawyers licensed to practice before the United States District Courts for
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appointed pursuant to section 1915(d) may be eligible for out-of-pocket
expenses and any fee provided by statute. However, an attorney is
"not guaranteed even minimal compensation" for the services
provided.' 2
In addition to "selecting" the attorney to be appointed in section
1915(d) cases, VLP offers assistance to selected attorneys who are un-
familiar with civil rights litigation. Such assistance includes providing
the attorney with written materials, offering seminars, and providing
consultations with attorneys familiar with the specific area of law in-
volved in the case.1 3
In Mallard, two inmates and one former inmate of the Iowa State
Penitentiary collectively brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 198314 alleging that prison officials had proceeded with false discipli-
nary procedures against them, physically abused them, and endan-
gered their lives by exposing them as informants.15
In June 1987, following an order by the district court to appoint
counsel for the indigent plaintiffs, VLP contacted John Mallard and
requested that he represent the plaintiffs. According to Mallard, he
never agreed to represent the plaintiffs, but did receive the case file in
order to learn more about the specific issues involved in the case.
Following Mallard's review of the case file and within one month
of being contacted by VLP, Mallard filed a motion to withdraw with
the district court. Mallard based his motion to withdraw on the
grounds that (1) representation of the plaintiffs would involve sub-
stantial discovery by deposition and a trial with many parties and wit-
nesses; (2) counsel for plaintiffs would need to examine and cross-
examine numerous parties and witnesses; and (3) Mallard was not
competent to undertake such representation. 16 As a basis for the fore-
the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa describing the referral sys-
tem. According to the letter, 130 appointments were made between
June 1984 and June 1985. -The combined lists for both districts embraced
roughly 3,500 lawyers. Each lawyer was eligible to be chosen every third
year, making her odds of being selected roughly one in nine in those
years.
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1817 n.1 (1989).
12. Id. at 1817.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding or redress.
15. Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814
(1989)(No. 87-1490).
16. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1817 (1989).
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going assertions, Mallard claimed that his legal experience rested in
business and securities law and that his "courtroom experience was
limited to the representation of creditors in debt collection and bank-
ruptcy proceedings."17
The motion to withdraw was denied by the magistrate. Mallard
appealed this decision to the district court. In his appeal, Mallard
reasserted his unfamiliarity with litigation, specifically with litigation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as grounds to grant his motion to withdraw.
Additionally, Mallard argued that "[florcing him to represent indi-
gent inmates in a complex action requiring depositions and discovery,
cross-examination of witnesses, and other trial skills,... would com-
pel him to violate his ethical obligation to take only those cases he
could handle competently and would exceed the court's authority
under § 1915(d)."18
Despite Mallard's plea to be released from representing the plain-
tiffs in the civil action, the district court determined that his brief in
support of the motion to withdraw evidenced that Mallardiwas compe-
tent to act as counsel in the action. Accordingly, the court concluded
he was competent to represent the civil rights litigants. Additionally,
the district court held that section 1915(d) empowers federal courts to
compel unwilling attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants and af-
firmed the magistrate's order denying the motion to withdraw.19
Not only did Mallard lose the first two battles with the magistrate
and the district court, but in the third battle before the Eighth Circuit
he suffered defeat once more. Mallard sought a writ of mandamus
from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to compel the district
court to grant his motion to withdraw. However, the court of appeals
denied the petition without comment.
Following the denial of the writ of mandamus by the Eighth Cir-
cuit, Mallard petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certio-
rari to determine whether an attorney can be compelled to represent a
plaintiff in a civil rights case when the attorney believes he is incom-
petent to do so. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order "to
resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether § 1915(d)
authorizes compulsory assignments of attorneys in civil cases."20
Mallard took his fight to the Court by attacking the Eighth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of section 1915(d). Mallard asserted that the
17. Id.
18. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1817 (1989).
19. Id.
20. Id. Compare, e.g., United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801-03 (9th
Cir. 1986); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1214 (1983)(section 1915(d) does not authorize compulsory appointments)
with, e.g., Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984)(section 1915(d)
permits mandatory assignments); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir.
1971).
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Eighth Circuit stood alone among the courts of appeals in construing
section 1915(d) as granting a federal court the authority to require un-
willing attorneys to represent indigent litigants in civil cases. Specifi-
cally, Mallard argued that the plain meaning of the word "request" as
contained in the statute prevented a federal court from relying
thereon to require an unwilling attorney to serve.2 1
While Mallard attacked the statutory interpretation given section
1915(d) by the Eighth Circuit, he also advanced arguments under theo-
ries of (1) the due process and taking clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments; (2) involuntary servitude pursuant to the
thirteenth amendment; and (3) freedom of speech as protected by the
first amendment. The Court, however, rested its opinion on the nar-
row issue of statutory construction.
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.22 The Court
first addressed the question of statutory interpretation. The Court has
repeatedly stated that the interpretation of a statute must begin with
the statute's language, construing the statute in the manner in which
the language used is typically understood.23 Section 1915(d) states
that "the court may request an attorney to represent" an indigent
litigant.24
The import of the term seems plain. To request that somebody do something
is to express a desire that he do it, even though he may not generally be disci-
plined or sanctioned if he declines. Of course, somebody who frequently re-
fuses another person's requests might not win that person's favor... In
everyday speech, the closest synonyms of the verb "request" are "ask", "peti-
tion," and "entreat." The verbs "require" and "demand" are not usually inter-
changeable with it.2 5
While Justice Brennan concluded that the plain meaning of "re-
quest" was the usage intended by Congress, as additional support for
this conclusion Justice Brennan compared the language of section
1915(c) with the language of section 1915(d). Section 1915(c), which
was enacted at the same time as section 1915(d) states: "The officers
of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in
such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same rem-
edies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases."2 6
21. Petitioner's Brief at 15-24, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814
(1989)(No. 87-1490).
22. Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia
and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined.
23. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989); Landreth Tim-
ber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1988).
25. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1818 (1989)(quoting WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1929 (3d ed. 1981); BLAcK's LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1172 (5th ed. 1979)).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)(1988).
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In section 1915(c), Congress, with its use of the word "shall," man-
dated the duties of court officers and witnesses. In section 1915(d), on
the other hand, Congress only empowered the federal courts to "re-
quest" an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant. "Congress
evidently knew how to require service when it deemed compulsory
service appropriate."27 Further evidence of Congress' intent not to
compel attorneys to provide representation under section 1915(d) is
found in the record of the House Debate concerning compulsory ser-
vice of court officers:
We are simply in these cases of charity and humanity compelling these of-
ficers, all of whom make good salaries, to do this work for nothing. That is all
the bill does. There may be one such case upon a docket of five hundred; and
they are not required to do much ex-officio service.2 8
While the congressional record specifically addressed the purpose
of the compulsory language of section 1915(c), the record was silent as
to section 1915(d), which strengthens the Court's finding that section
1915(d) was intended by Congress to authorize federal courts to re-
quest, rather than require, an attorney to serve.29 Justice Brennan
concluded that when the plain meaning of "request" is viewed in con-
junction with the mandatory language of section 1915(c), it is clear
that Congress "did not intend § 1915(d) to license compulsory appoint-
ments of counsel."30
Justice Brennan supported this conclusion by examining the his-
torical context in which Congress approved section 1915(d).31
By the late 19th century, at least 12 states had statutes permitting courts to
assign counsel to represent indigent litigants. The Congress that adopted
§ 1915(d) was undoubtedly aware of those statutes, for the brief and otherwise
unilluminating Report of the House Judiciary Committee states that the bill
containing § 1915(d) was designed to enable persons unable to afford legal rep-
resentation to avail themselves of the courts, as "[m]any humane and enlight-
ened states" that had similar laws allowed them to do.3 2
However, "none of those state statutes ... provided that a court could
merely request that an attorney serve without compensation."33 In
27. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1818 (1989).
28. Id. at 1818 n.3 (quoting 23 CONG. REc. 5199 (1892)).
29. Id. at 1818.
30. Id.
31. Id. Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens reached the opposite conclusion
under the same facts:
In 1892, state courts had statutory authority to order lawyers to render
assistance to indigent civil litigants in a dozen States, and common law
power to appoint counsel in at least another 10 States. Congress in-
tended to "open the United States Courts' to impoverished litigants and
"to keep pace" with the laws of these "[m]any humane and enlightened
states."
Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st
Sess., 1-2 (1892)).
32. Id. at 1818-19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1892)).
33. Id.
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fact, all of them empowered a court with authority to "assign" or "ap-
point" counsel.3
To the extent that the "assignment" or "appointment" of counsel denotes the
imposition of a duty to undertake representation that courts may enforce,
Congress' decision to allow the federal courts to do no more than "request"
attorneys to serve, in full awareness of more stringent state practices, seems to
evince a desire to permit attorneys to decline representation of indigent liti-
gants if in their view their personal, professional, or ethical concerns bid them
to do so.ts
Accordingly, had Congress intended section 1915(d) to empower
courts to appoint or assign counsel to serve, it could have simply mir-
rored the language of the state statutes already enacted which empow-
ered state courts with such authority.
The arguments presented thus far by Justice Brennan are sound
and support the majority's holding that section 1915(d) does not em-
power courts to make coercive appointments of counsel. However,
Justice Brennan had one final argument remaining in support of the
Court's decision. To further support the Court's conclusion, Justice
Brennan compared federal statutes which were passed prior to, and
following, the enactment of section 1915(d).
Only one federal statute was passed prior to the enactment of sec-
tion 1915(d) dealing with appointment of counsel. This statute pro-
vided for court-appointed counsel to a criminal defendant accused of a
capital crime: "Tlo make his full defense by counsel learned in the
law... the court before whom such person shall be tried, or some
judge thereof, shall .. .immediately, upon his request . . .assign to
such person such counsel, not exceeding two, as such person shall de-
sire .... ,,36 Relying upon the language of the foregoing statute, Jus-
tice Brennan stated:
[W]hen Congress enacted § 1915(d), the verb "assign" was already part of the
federal statutory lexicon; Congress' decision to depart from prior usage in
fashioning a rule for civil cases involving indigent litigants might be taken to
display a reluctance to require attorneys to serve, even though Congress ap-
parently mandated service in the much more serious case of criminal defend-
ants facing the death penalty.[3 7]
34. Id. at 1819 (citing ARK. STAT. § 1053 (1884)(assign); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 26, § 3,
(1884)(assign); IND. REV. STAT., vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, art. 2, § 15 (1852)(assign); KY.
STAT. § 884 (1915)(Act of May 27, 1892)(assign); Mo. REV. STAT. § 2918 (1889)(as-
sign); NEv. CoMP. LAws § 3126 (1900)(appointment of attorney in certain contract
cases); N.J. GEN. STAT., vol. 2, Practice § 369, p. 2598 (1896)(enacted 1799)(assign);
N. MEX. COMP. LAws § 2289 (1884)(appointment of attorney to represent terri-
tory); 1876 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 448, art. 3, § 460 (assign); 1869 N.C. PuB. LAws, ch. 96,
§ 2 (assign); TENN. CODE § 3980 (1858)(appoint and assign); TEx. REV. STAT., art.
1125 (1879)(appoint); VA. CODE ANN. § 3538 (1904)(appeared in 1849
Code)(assign)).
35. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1819 (1989).
36. Id. at 1820 (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 118 presently codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988))).
37. Id. at 1820-21.
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This inference finds additional support in Congress' actions subsequent to
§ 1915(d)'s enactment. Every federal statute still in force that was passed af-
ter 1892 and that authorizes courts to provide counsel states that courts may
"assign" or "appoint" attorneys, just as did the 1790 capital representation
statute.[3 8 ] Congress' decision to promulgate these apparently coercive repre-
sentation statutes when § 1915(d) was already on the books and after it had
been extended to cover criminal as well as civil cases . . . suggests that
§ 1915(d)'s use of "request" instead of "assign" or "appoint" was understood to
signify that § 1915(d) did not authorize compulsory appointments. In any case,
Congress' enactments after 1892 afford no reason to believe that the plain
meaning of § 1915(d) is not its intended meaning. 3 9
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the Court rested its conclu-
sion that section 1915(d) does not authorize federal courts to compel
attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants upon several grounds:
(1) the plain meaning of the statutory language, "request"; (2) the
contrast with the "shall" statutory language of section 1915(c), enacted
concurrently with section 1915(d); (3) the historical context in which
section 1915(d) was enacted; and (4) the use of mandatory language by
Congress in federal statutes enacted prior to, and following, the enact-
ment of section 1915(d).
The Court next addressed the two remaining contentions of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, specifi-
cally, (1) that interpreting section 1915(d) as only authorizing a court
to "request" an attorney's service strips the statute of any purpose and
thus makes the statute superfluous; and (2) that Mallard was not enti-
tled to a writ of mandamus to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 40
A brief examination of each of these assertions, as well as the Court's
response, will be beneficial to this discussion.
The district court asserted that section 1915(d) must be construed
to empower a federal court to compel attorneys to represent indigent
civil litigants, or the statute would be superfluous and useless. Addi-
tionally, the district court asserted that the power to request counsel
to assist is already embodied in the court's authority without the statu-
tory authorization.41 In response, Justice Brennan stated:
38. Id. at 1821. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)(appoint; criminal defendant); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3503(c)(1988)(assign; criminal defendant at deposition to preserve testimony);
18 U.S.C. § 4109 (1988)(appoint; proceeding to verify offender's consent to trans-
fer to or from United States); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b)(1988)(appoint; Indiana child
custody proceedings); 42 U.S.C. § 1971(f)(1988)(assign; defendant in voting rights
case); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a)(1988)(appoint; complainant seeking injunction under
civil rights laws); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(1988)(appoint; title VII complainant);
42 U.S.C. § 3413(1)(1988)(assign; commitment of narcotic addict). See also FED.
RULE CRIM. P. 44 (assign; criminal defendant). Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1988)(courts-
martial shall "detail" trial counsel and defense counsel).
39. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1820-21 (1989).
40. Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-6, Mal-
lard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989)(No. 87-1490).
41. Id. at 7.
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Statutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers. Section
1915(d), for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a "frivolous or malicious"
action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the
absence of the statutory provision. Nor do respondents premises compel its
conclusion. Section 1915(d) plays a useful role in the statutory scheme if it
informs lawyers that the court's requests to provide legal assistance are appro-
priate requests, hence not to be ignored or disregarded in the mistaken belief
that they are improper, like a judge's request to cut short cross-examination so
that he can go fishing. Section 1915(d) may meaningfully be read to legitimize
a court's request to represent a poor litigant and therefore to confront a law-
yer with an important ethical decision; one need not interpret it to authorize
the imposition of sanctions should a lawyer decide not to serve in order to give
purpose to the provision.4 2
Accordingly, the Court concluded that section 1915(d) simply codifies
the inherent judicial authority to request attorneys to serve, and oper-
ates to legitimize this authority in the eyes of the attorney so
requested.
Justice Brennan next turned to the district court's final argument,
which notably should have been a threshold question, that Mallard
failed to meet his burden of proof for a writ of mandamus.43 The
Court quoted Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association:
The traditional use of the writ [of mandamus] in aid of appellate jurisdiction
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or compel it to exercise
its authority when it is its duty to do so.4 4
Additionally, a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus must demon-
strate a "clear abuse of discretion,"45 or actions amounting to "usurpa-
tion of [judicial] power."4 6
In seeking a writ of mandamus, Mallard asserted that the district
court wrongfully exercised its jurisdiction in appointing him to repre-
sent the indigent litigants.47 The Court agreed and held that the court
of appeals should have ordered the district court to grant Mallard's
motion to withdraw.
Under the facts presented by Mallard, the Court concluded Mal-
lard had met his burden of showing that his right to issuance of the
writ was clear and indisputable. "In resting its decision solely on
§ 1915(d)-the only ground for decision properly before us-the Dis-
trict Court plainly acted beyond its 'jurisdiction' as our decisions have
interpreted that term, for, as we decide today, § 1915(d) does not au-
42. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821 (1989).
43. Id. at 1822.
44. Id. (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
45. Id. (quoting DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217
(1945)).
46. Id. (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)).
47. Id. See Brief of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at 4, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S.
Ct: 1814 (1989)(No. 87-1490).
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
thorize coercive appointments of counsel."48
Although, the Court held that section 1915(d) does not authorize
coercive appointments of counsel, its decision fails to answer many of
the questions arising from mandatory appointments of counsel.
We emphasize that our decision today is limited to interpreting § 1915(d). We
do not mean to question, let alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to as-
sist those who are too poor to afford counsel, or to suggest that requests made
pursuant to § 1915(d) may be lightly declined because they give rise to no ethi-
cal claim. 4 9
In other words, the Court left unanswered many important questions
relating to mandatory appointments of counsel.
III. MALLARD: QUESTIONS FOR ANOTHER DAY
It is questionable whether the decision of the Court in Mallard an-
swers the question of an attorney's judicially imposed obligation to
represent indigent civil litigants. While the Court disposed of the stat-
utory interpretation of section 1915(d), it left unanswered important
questions concerning the ability of federal courts to compel attorneys
to represent indigents for little or no compensation.
The following discussion focuses on the relation of the legal profes-
sion with the federal court system. This relationship is analyzed
within three areas: (1) the historical foundation of the officer of the
court doctrine; (2) the justification for denial of an attorney's constitu-
tional rights; and (3) the ethical dilemma presented by the responsi-
bilities of an attorney to the legal profession. Each of these areas
present potential grounds for an attorney to decline a court appoint-
ment and therefore require discussion when assessing the unanswered
questions raised in Mallard.
A. Officer of the Court: The Weak Historial Foundation of an Over-
Used Doctrine
The Mallard majority determined that section 1915(d) does not em-
power federal courts to compel attorneys to represent indigent civil
litigants. However, it was a sharply divided Court which reached this
decision. Additionally, Justices Brennan and Kennedy expressed the
48. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1822 (1989).
49. Id. at 1822-23. See also id. at 1822-23 nn.6 & 8. Additionally, Justice Kennedy,
concurring, spoke to the narrow purpose of the Court's holding.
Our decision today speaks to the interpretation of a statute, to the re-
quirements of the law, and not to the professional responsibility of the
lawyer. Lawyers, like all those who practice a profession, have obliga-
tions to their calling which exceed their obligations to the State. Law-
yers also have obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of
the court. Accepting a court's request to represent the indigent is one of
those traditional obligations.
Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring.)
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importance of a lawyer's ethical duty to represent indigent litigants.5 0
In opposition to the majority holding, the dissent, written by Justice
Stevens,5 ' contended that section 1915(d) rested upon the court's in-
herent power to compel an attorney's service and the ethical obliga-
tion of an attorney was a prerequisite to admittance in the federal
bar.52
The relationship between a court and the members of its bar is not defined by
statute alone. The duties of the practitioner are an amalgam of tradition, re-
spect for the profession, the inherent power of the judiciary, and the com-
mands that are set forth in canons of ethics, rules of court, and legislative
enactments.5 3
Justice Stevens further stated that "a court's power to require a
lawyer to render assistance to the indigent is firmly rooted in the au-
thority to define the terms and conditions upon which members are
admitted to the bar, and to exercise 'those powers necessary to protect
the functioning of its own processes.' 54 This is another way of say-
ing, as the Court did in Powell v. Alabama,55 that "[a]ttorneys are of-
ficers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by
such an appointment."56
The relationship of attorneys with the court has a long and dis-
puted history.57 The concept of attorneys as "officers of the court" is
generally exalted by federal courts as being rooted in the history of
the English legal profession. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
lied heavily upon English tradition in United States v. Dillon58 to up-
hold the constitutionality of requiring court-appointed counsel to
subsidize an indigent defendant's legal costs and proceedings to vacate
his conviction.
The Dillon case represents the extent to which many federal
courts have gone in denying compensation to court-appointed attor-
neys. In Dillon, a court-appointed attorney, following proceedings to
vacate the judgment of an indigent defendant, applied for compensa-
tion pursuant to the district court's invitation. The district court
granted the attorney's application for compensation, holding that its
order requiring the attorney to serve was a taking of the attorney's
50. Id. at 1822-23.
51. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice
O'Connor.
52. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1823-26 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1824 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton
et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring)).
55. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
56. Id. at 73.
57. For an excellent and concise historical overview of the lawyer and the legal pro-
fession, see R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TmEs (1953).
58. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
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property for public use, within the meaning of the fifth amendment
requiring just compensation. The decision of the district court was ap-
pealed and reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Dillon Court stated that an attorney's obligation to represent
indigents when ordered by the court was "an ancient and established
tradition, and that appointed counsel have generally been compen-
sated, if at all, only by statutory fees which would be inadequate under
just compensation principles, and which are usually payable only in
limited types of cases."5 9 Further, the Dillon court held that coercive
appointments of counsel without just compensation was not a taking
under the fifth amendment because "representation of indigents
under court order, without a fee, is a condition under which lawyers
are licensed to practice as officers of the court."6 0 The Dillon court
also found that applying for admission to the practice of law evidenced
an implied understanding by applicants that as an officer of the court
the attorney is obligated to represent indigents for little or no compen-
sation whenever deemed appropriate by the court. "Thus, the lawyer
has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is called
upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a 'taking of his
services.' "61
In arriving at the conclusion that attorneys are officers of the
court, the court of appeals drew upon portions of the brief of the
United States which concluded that the concept of officer of the court
comes from English tradition. However, this reliance upon English
legal tradition is clearly misplaced.
According to the attorneys for the United States in Dillon, a tradi-
tion of representation of the poor has existed in England "for nearly
half a millennium." 62 Further, the United States asserted that "serje-
ants-at-law from a very early period might be required by any of these
courts [in which they could practice] to plead for a poor man."63 The
commitment of an attorney to serve when ordered by a court was put
in unequivocal terms during the seventeenth century by Chief Justice
Hale. Chief Justice Hale stated that "if the court should assign [a ser-
jeant] to be counsel, he ought to attend; and if he refuse, we would not
hear him, nay, we would make bold to commit him."64
The argument of the attorneys for the United States in Dillon at-
tempted to analyze the role of modern American attorneys in light of
the role played by serjeants-at-law in the English legal system. While
59. Id. at 635.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 636 (appendix).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing - [sic] v. Scroggs, 1 Free. 389, 89 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1674)).
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this analogy may seem reasonable on its face, it in fact attempts to
compare two distinct groups.
The evolution of the legal profession in England dates back to the
Medieval period, when three distinct professional categories devel-
oped: (1) the judges and the serjeants-at-law; (2) the barristers; and
(3) the attorneys.65 In the fourteenth century, significant distinctions
existed between these three categories. A major distinction, and per-
haps the most important one, was that judicial appointments were re-
served exclusively to the serjeants-at-law. Serjeants were required to
take an oath of office to serve the King's people and uphold justice, "so
that the degree of sergeant was a public office."66 In order to distin-
guish themselves from the other two categories of attorneys, serjeants
wore a distinctive dress which included a long robe and a white silk
coif which they did not remove even in the presence of the King.
"They were created by letters patent and were paid a fixed salary by
the Crown, doing some of the work of representing the Crown done
later by the Attorney General and Solicitor General."67 Further,
serjeants were given exclusive rights to practice in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas and were the only category of attorneys allowed to practice
before both courts of law and courts of equity. Additionally, serjeants
could, and did, demand large fees for their services.6s
The serjeant's duty to serve developed from his social and political
standing. The serjeant was "an officer of the court in the truest
sense."6 9 However, the place of the serjeant in English history is of
little practical use in justifying the holding that American attorneys
are officers of the court. While the serjeant was in fact an officer of
the court, "[h]e has no counterpart in American practice." 70 Thus, the
place of the serjeant in English history is of little relevance to contem-
porary issues affecting attorneys in the United States. An additional
problem surfaces in attempting to compare serjeants in particular, and
the English bar in general, to the American legal profession.
"Whatever the authority granted to courts by statute, or assumed by
them as inherent to their common-law role, that authority may not
have been so widely used, and unwilling lawyers, no matter what their
rank, may seldom have been actually coerced into donating their
services." 71
The foregoing discussion does not present the entire historical
background for the place of the serjeant in the history of the English
65. R. POuND, supra note 57, at 82
66. Id. at 83.
67. Id.
68. Shapiro, The Enigma Of The Lawyer's Duty To Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735, 746
(1980).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 746-47.
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legal profession; however, "enough has been said to conclude that the
case for compulsory, gratuitous service by American lawyers-in par-
ticular cases or on a broader scale-cannot be based in substantial part
on English tradition."72
The conclusion that the coerced appointment of counsel by federal
courts cannot rest upon the English tradition dictates that the tradi-
tion of court-appointed counsel in America be briefly examined. As
noted previously, the Dillon court exalted "the obligation of the legal
profession to serve indigents on court order [as] an ancient and estab-
lished tradition."73 However, the issue does not appear to have been
settled at any point in American history, perhaps with the exception
of the earliest period of colonization.
In the early Colonies the question of court-appointed counsel did
not arise essentially because "[1]awyers as a class were very unpopular
in the early Colonial history."74 In fact, lawyers were viewed as un-
necessary in the earlier Colonial period and attempts were made to
work out legal problems among groups based on the common law as
interpreted by the common man. This "common man interpretation"
approach was so entrenched in the Colonial viewpoint that legal train-
ing was often deemed unnecessary or even undesirable in a judge.75
During the period between the early seventeenth century and the
Revolution, the Colonies wrestled with the inadequacies of a system in
which every man was his own attorney. As the Colonies developed, so
did the need for a trained legal profession. "By the time of the
Revolution the legal profession in most of the Colonies had become
well established in public estimation, well educated, and well qualified
by study of law."76
The period following the Revolution up to the period of the Civil
War saw the development of an established bar for the American legal
profession. However, with respect to court-appointed representation
72. Id. at 749.
73. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965).
74. R. POUND, supra note 57, at 132.
75. Id. at 132 n.3. According to Pound,
[s]even of the eleven Chief justices of New York from 1691 to 1778
were not trained lawyers. In appointing judges "it was considered an
object to embrace as many various callings in life as the number ofjudges would admit." Of the 33 who sat on the bench of the highest court
of Massachusetts from 1692 to 1775, as appears from the individual
sketches in Washburn.... only nine had some degree of legal training.
In 1764 the Governor of New Jersey wrote that the "gentlemen sitting asjudges in the courts of the colonies were not and could not be expected to
be lawyers learned in the law." Until the era of the Revolution it was
not "deemed necessary or even advisable to have judges learned in the
law."
Id. (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 163.
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for civil litigants, "[b]eyond a few statutes in contemporary commenta-
ries, the problem of the lawyer's duty does not appear to have at-
tracted a great deal of attention until the later part of the nineteenth
century-when lawyers began objecting to assignments to serve with-
out pay."'77
In civil litigation "[o]rganized legal aid did not make its first ap-
pearance until the late nineteenth century."78 It was not until 1892
that Congress gave federal courts discretion to "request" an attorney
to represent an indigent civil litigant.79 Additionally, there were few
states that had ever done much to aid the poor in civil litigation, and
the courts of only twelve states had authority to assign attorneys in
such cases. Even in the states in which the court had the clear author-
ity to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants, the power to appoint
was rarely exercised.8 0
As early as 1854, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the
coerced appointment of attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants
was unfair to attorneys and unlikely to succeed in insuring representa-
tion for the poor.S1 The court noted that any citizen put in jeopardy of
life or liberty has a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel, a
right that cannot be eliminated simply because the citizen is too poor
to employ counsel. "The defense of the poor, in such cases, is a duty
resting somewhere, which will be at once conceded as essential to the
accused, to the Court, and to the public. And the only question is, who
shall pay?"8 2 The public, the court reasoned, should not be allowed to
neglect its duty to provide representation for the poor by transferring
that duty to the legal profession. "An attorney of the Court is under
no obligation, honorary or otherwise, to volunteer his services. As a
matter of private duty, it devolves as much on any citizen of equal
wealth to employ counsel in the defence, as on the attorney to render
service gratuitously."8 3 Additionally, "[i]f the state has not made pro-
vision for the defence of poor prisoners, it has presumed and tres-
passed unjustly upon the rights and generous feelings of the bar;
levying upon that class a discriminatory and unconstitutional tax."8 4
The court concluded that it was not the duty of the legal profession to
bear the burden of representation for poor litigants simply because the
public has neglected to do so. "Yet is the defence of the poor an imper-
ative duty resting somewhere. We have seen that it does not devolve
77. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 749-50.
78. Id. at 752.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1988).
80. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 752.
81. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854). See aso Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473
(Ia. 1850); County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654 (1861).
82. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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upon a private citizen. It must, therefore, devolve upon the public or
some portion of it."85
Four years prior to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision that an
attorney has a right to reasonable compensation, the Iowa Supreme
Court made a similar decision.
If attorneys, as officers of the court, have obligations under which they must
act professionally, they also have rights to which they are entitled, and which
they may justly claim in common with other men in the business of life.
Among these rights, that of reasonable compensation for services rendered in
their profession is justly to be considered. 8 6
The Iowa court held that the mere fact that an attorney is an officer of
the court did not obligate an attorney to provide legal representation
without compensation. "His time, labor and professional skills are his
own. He should not be required to bestow them gratuitously at the
will of the court, any more than should any other officer."8 7
The most interesting point made by the Iowa court was its inter-
pretation of attorneys as officers of the court. In its analysis of the
place of American attorneys in relation to the court, it concluded that
the tradition did not rest upon the place of the serjeants in English
history; American historical development lacks the cohesiveness to
conclude that American attorneys should be obligated to render legal
services without compensation. However, the Iowa Supreme Court
identified attorneys as officers of the court. What is significant is that
the court did not use this identification to justify uncompensated legal
services by court-appointed counsel. Instead, the court compared the
status of an attorney with other court officials who are compensated
for services rendered to the court.88 The court concluded that to re-
quire attorneys, whether or not they are officers of the court, to repre-
sent the poor without compensation is an unconstitutional tax upon
their services.8 9
Moreover, the Hall court was well aware of the inadequacies of re-
quiring the legal profession to absorb the cost of representation of the
poor. In fact, both the Indiana and Iowa courts recognized that when a
social obligation exists, such as providing legal services to the poor,
85. Id. at 18-19.
86. Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473, 476 (Ia. 1850).
87. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court recently made a similar holding in State v.
Ryan, 233 Neb. 151, 444 N.W.2d 656 (1989), in which it declared that the state
district courts must provide fair compensation to attorneys appointed to repre-
sent indigent prisoners, reasoning that the obligation to provide counsel to indi-
gent prisoners was a societal obligation and should not be placed upon individual
attorneys. Id. at 159, 444 N.W.2d at 661.
88. Modern examples of these court officials are bailiffs, clerks and court reporters
who work as employees under a wage or salary agreement. Because the court can
require their services as employees of the government, it can do so without addi-
tional compensation, for assistance to the indigent.
89. Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473, 476 (Ia. 1850).
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that obligation should not be borne by any single segment of society
and, more importantly, society should not be allowed to ignore its obli-
gations by doing so.90
The federal court system of today ought to examine its "long his-
tory and tradition" more carefully before placing upon the legal pro-
fession an obligation which ought to be borne by society as a whole.
However, as will be discussed in the following section, rather than
reassessing the "officer of the court" designation, the federal courts
have used the doctrine to justify denying an attorney the constitu-
tional right to refuse uncompensated court appointments.
B. Officer of the Court Doctrine as a Justification for Denial of
Constitutional Rights
The constitutional right most directly implicated by mandatory
court appointments is the right to compensation. An in-depth exami-
nation of the takings and involuntary servitude clauses of the federal
constitution is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, an exami-
nation of how federal courts have held that compelled service of attor-
neys without compensation is not prohibited under the fifth
amendment will be beneficial to this discussion.91 In United States v.
Dillon92, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend the protection of the
fifth amendment to court-appointed attorneys. The Ninth Circuit jus-
tified this holding by stating that compulsory service was not "a taking
of [an attorney's] services without just compensation when he per-
forms an obligation imposed upon him by ancient traditions of his pro-
fession and as an officer assisting the court in the administration of
justice."93
The decision of the Ninth Circuit can be stated as: It is not a taking
to require an attorney to serve without compensation because he is
already required to serve as an officer of the court. Put more simply,
an attorney is obligated to serve because he is obligated to serve. This
circular reasoning is of great value to federal courts because it is virtu-
ally immune from attack. Or is it? As was noted in the section dis-
cussing the history of the doctrine of officer of the court, the doctrine
itself is difficult to trace and almost certainly is more judicial rhetoric
than historical fact. Despite the questionable historical basis of com-
pelled service, federal courts, as in Dillon, have justified the taking of
90. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473 (Ia.
1850).
91. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of
property "for public use without just conpensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution abolished involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
92. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
93. Id. at 636.
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compensation from one group of citizens (attorneys) for the benefit of
another (indigent defendants and litigants).9 4
However, while federal courts rely upon the officer of the court
doctrine to escape the takings and involuntary servitude questions
raised by the fifth amendment, they abandon this view when an attor-
ney is asked to provide the costs of defense in litigation. The protec-
tions in the fifth amendment are applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment and the doctrine of incorporation. 95 The
Eighth Circuit in Williamson v. Vardeman,96 addressed the question
whether the courts of Missouri could, consistently with the fourteenth
amendment, compel attorneys to represent indigent defendants when
the state legislature failed to appropriate funds to compensate attor-
neys for their services and to pay the necessary expenses of defense.97
In Williamson, an attorney was appointed to represent an indigent
defendant who had been charged with four counts of selling a con-
trolled substance. The court stated in its appointment order that the
attorney might not receive payment or recover his expenses because
funding for such appointments was exhausted. Faced with the pros-
pect of serving without compensation and the additional prospect of
providing the cost of defense for the defendant, the attorney refused
to serve. The Missouri state court held the attorney in contempt and
sentenced him to ten days in prison. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme
Court denied any relief for the attorney. Turning to the federal court
system, the attorney filed a petition for habeas relief in the federal
district court. However, the federal district court dismissed the peti-
tion and the attorney appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
On appeal Williamson asserted, first, that the requirement that he
render services without compensation violated the thirteenth amend-
ment prohibition of involuntary servitude and constituted a taking of
liberty and property without due process; and, second, that the re-
quirement that he provide legal expenses incident to the defense of
the accused similarly violated the due process clause.98
The Eighth Circuit held that "[a]ttorneys may constitutionally be
compelled to represent indigent defendants without compensation.
The thirteenth amendment has never been applied to forbid compul-
sion of traditional modes of public service even when only a limited
segment of the population is so compelled." 99 Moreover, the Eighth
94. See Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1984); William-
son v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)(due pro-
cess clause of fourteenth amendment incorporates fundamental rights of the first
eight amendments).
96. 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982).
97. Id. at 1212.
98. Id. at 1213.
99. Id. at 1214. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589-90 n.11 (1973)(wit-
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Circuit stated that
[t]he vast majority of federal and state courts which have addressed the due
process issue have decided that requiring counsel to serve without compensa-
tion is not an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensa-
tion.[1 0 0 ] These courts reason that compulsion of service is not a taking
because there is a preexisting duty to provide such service.[ 10 1 ] The source of
this duty is a lawyer's status as an officer of the court.
1 0 2
Relying upon the Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Dillon 10 3
and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Ala-
bama,'0 4 the Eighth Circuit concluded "that compulsion of services
without compensation . . . does not contravene the federal
Constitution."105
However, while the Williamson court concluded that the officer of
the court doctrine justified compelled appointments of attorneys with-
out compensation, it was not willing to extend the doctrine to compel
an attorney to provide the cost of defense or litigation. The court held
that "[r]equiring lawyers to pay the necessary expenses of criminal
defense work without reimbursement is ... constitutionally distinct
from merely compelling lawyers to provide their services."1 06 While
the court concluded that requiring attorneys to pay "costs" is unconsti-
tutional, the reasoning used by the Eighth Circuit reveals the weak-
ness of the assertion that appointments without compensation are not
in conflict with the Constitution. The court reasoned as follows:
While we understand that in many cases, because of lost opportunities and
payment of fixed costs, the burden of providing services without compensation
is comparable to that of paying expenses, lawyers have no duty to pay ex-
penses. The class of lawyers has no more obligation to pay such expenses than
nesses); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918)(draft); Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916)(work on public roads); Bertelson v. Cooney, 213
F.2d 275,277-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954)(special draft of medical
personnel).
100. See, eg., Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1078-79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910
(1973); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 978 (1966); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488, 489-90 (Alaska 1966); State v.
Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 466, 409 P.2d 750, 755 (1966); Bibb County v. Han-
cock, 211 Ga. 429, 86 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1955); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App.
343, 148 S.E.2d 143, 146 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Warner v. Com-
monwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (1966);
State v. Clifton, 247 La. 495, 172 So. 2d 657, 667 (1965); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev.
582, 555 P.2d 490, 493 (1976); Scott v. State, 216 Tenn. 375, 392 S.W.2d 681, 685-87
(1965); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Ut. 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943); Presby v. Klick-
itat County, 5 Wash. 329, 31 P. 876 (1892). But see Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525
(1853)(state constitution's takings clause); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298
(Ky. 1972); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Ut. 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).
101. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
102. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1982).
103. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
104. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
105. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1982).
106. Id.
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any other class of citizens. Compelling individual attorneys to bear such costs
raises serious due process issues.1 0 7
In this passage the Eighth Circuit is trying to distinguish between a
court's ability to compel legal services without compensation, which it
deems constitutional, and compelling an attorney to bear the costs of
defense, which it held unconstitutional. In fact, the lost compensation
of fees in many cases represents a greater burden to bear by the attor-
ney than the "costs" of defense in litigation. The Eighth Circuit states
that lost compensation is justified in light of an attorney's duty as an
officer of the court. On the other hand, the court also recognizes that
attorneys are no more obligated to provide the expenses of defense
than any other class of society.10s This distinction between lost com-
pensation and compulsory payment of expenses employed by the Wil-
liamson court is arbitrary and rests upon conclusory reasoning. The
flaw in the court's reasoning evidences that the federal courts should
not be overly confident in the viability of the officer of the court
doctrine.
If in fact the officer of the court doctrine grants a federal court the
power to compel uncompensated legal services and if lawyers have in-
deed "consented to, and assumed this obligation,"10 9 it logically fol-
lows that attorneys may also be compelled to provide the cost of such
service without presenting "serious" due process, takings or involun-
tary servitude questions. It would seem reasonable that a federal
court could demand the attorney's services, as an officer of the court,
including his financial support to further the aims of the judicial
system.
In summary, the officer of the court doctrine provides a federal
court with a necessary premise to justify uncompensated service to the
state. Absent this premise, it is difficult to place upon the attorney the
obligation to provide legal services without compensation. Whatever
"social" benefits the officer of the court doctrine provides, the policy
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. In fact, it should be evident
that the doctrine itself probably cannot pass a constitutional examina-
tion. As the Supreme Court stated, "[i]t is axiomatic that the Fifth
Amendment's just compensation provision is 'designed to bar govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' "110
The use of the officer of the court doctrine to compel attorneys to
serve raises serious constitutional questions. Moreover, the use of the
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1965).
110. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987)(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
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doctrine by the courts may present attorneys with an ethical dilemma.
The following discussion will briefly examine this dilemma.
C. Officer of the Court Doctrine and a Lawyer's Responsibilities to the
Legal Profession: The Horns of an Ethical Dilemma
Justice Kennedy, concurring with the decision in Mallard,11l
stated that "[l]awyers, like all those who practice the profession, have
obligations to their calling which exceed their obligations to the
State."" 2 Further, Justice Kennedy concluded that lawyers have obli-
gations to the profession of law and to the court by virtue of their
"special status as officer of the court."113 This status as an officer of
the court and the lawyer's duty to improve the legal profession obli-
gates the lawyer to accept "a court's request to represent the indi-
gent."11 4 Additionally, Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated
that "[t]he relationship between a court and the members of its bar is
not defined by statute alone.""15 The duties of the lawyer "are an
amalgam of tradition, respect for the profession, the inherent power of
the judiciary, and the commands that are set forth in canons of ethics,
rules of court, and legislative enactments."'116
An attorney is, or should be, aware that the profession of law
brings with it the "obligation" to represent clients who cannot afford
counsel and without representation might not otherwise have the full
protections of the Constitution. This willingness to represent the indi-
gent distinguishes the legal profession from other professions. The
legal profession's commitment to pro bono service is recognized by the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge
this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee
to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organi-
zations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the
legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal
services to persons of limited means.1 17
However, an attorney's ethical obligation to render pro bono ser-
vice is not equivalent to a federal court's power to compel an unwilling
attorney to represent an indigent without compensation. In fact, as
this Note will argue, a federal court's insistence' that an attorney rep-
resent an indigent against the attorney's "ethical objections" may com-
111. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
112. Id. at 1823 (Kennedy J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 6.1 (1989)[hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
pel an attorney to violate ethical rules, and may also constitute a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct by the appointing judge.
The Model Rules provide that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably nec-
essary for the representation." ' s This rule operates to maintain the
integrity of the legal profession, as well as ensuring that the indigent
client is competently represented.
When an attorney is ethically compelled to decline a court appoint-
ment because of the attorney's belief that she is not competent to han-
dle a case, and the court nevertheless refuses to allow the withdrawal,
the attorney is confronted with a serious ethical and professional di-
lemma.1 9 Should the attorney obey the court order and violate the
ethical obligation to provide competent legal services, or should she
refuse to follow the court order and almost certainly face a charge of
contempt? To rephrase the question, in light of the foregoing discus-
sion, if a court concludes that an attorney is an officer of the court,
does this conclusion justify the court's power to compel the attorney's
service, when it forces the attorney to violate her ethical obligations?
The conflict of loyalties between bompetent representation and ob-
ligations imposed by the court may give rise to additional concerns.
"A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on be-
half of a client."120 As the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated:
"When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of
business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally dis-
posed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon
whom he looks as his advocate and his champion."12 ' In a case where
the attorney must decide between a court's compelled appointment
and the concerns of professional incompetence, the attorney is con-
fronted with the dilemma of conforming to the wishes of two masters.
The client must receive competent representation to protect his
rights and to preserve the integrity of the legal profession. The court,
in deciding when an attorney is competent to handle a case, is the
master of that attorney's freedom of choice. Within the guidelines of a
lawyer's professional responsibility in an adversary system it is, and
must be, clear that the client is master. The indigent client should not
be compelled by a court to rely upon the representation of an attorney
not competent in the area of law being litigated. Issues regarding con-
118. Id. Rule 1.1. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6
(1983)[hereinafter MODEL CODE](a lawyer should represent a client compe-
tently); MODEL CODE EC 6-1 (a lawyer should act with competence and proper
care in representing clients).
119. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1817 (1984).
120. MODEL CODE, supra note 118, Canon 5.
121. Grievance Comm. v. Rattner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964).
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flicts of interest may also arise within the context of court appoint-
ments. The Model Code states that "a lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interest."322 While this rule is gener-
ally applied in the context of attorneys acquiring a property interest in
their client's action, the scope of the rule may be implicated when an
attorney is appointed to represent an indigent client.
The economic realities of the practice of law have been exploited
by some, recognized by others, and ignored by an idealistic few. Yet
the terms "client development" and "billable hours" are uniformly
used and understood by all attorneys. Even the most altruistic in the
legal profession recognize that providing legal services is in many re-
spects a business, and that attorneys are business people who must
support themselves and their families just as other individuals in soci-
ety. For those attorneys who need paying clients to maintain their
income, a court appointment can mean the loss of needed income and,
to the extent that their time is consumed by non-billable services, the
loss of business opportunities.
Although an attorney should assist in improving the legal system
by providing free legal services for those unable to pay, 23 it is also
true that an attorney's own financial need for compensation can influ-
ence him to pursue a court-appointed action less vigorously in order to
concentrate on profitable cases. An attorney may also be influenced
to settle for an unduly low amount just to have the "freebie" case over.
The attorney's financial concerns must be balanced against his re-
sponsibility to provide legal services for the indigent, and not all cir-
cumstances will support a valid conflict of interest claim. However,
when economic and personal concerns arise as a result of a court-ap-
pointment, the attorney's independent judgment cannot be guaran-
teed. In such cases, courts must not hide behind the idealistic image of
"officers of the court" faithfully performing their duties, while being
blind to the economic realities of the practice of law.
When ethical concerns are at issue, compelling an attorney to rep-
resent an indigent client not only places the attorney in a dilemma,
but also places the appointing judge at the heart of an ethical violation.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should be faith-
ful to the law and maintain professional competence in it."124 It also
provides that, "[a] judge should diligently discharge his administrative
responsibilities [and] maintain professional competence in judicial
administration."12 5
122. MODEL CODE, supra note 118, DR 5-101(A).
123. Id. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 118, EC 2-25.
124. CODE OF JUDIcIAL CONDucT Canon 3(A)(1)(1989).
125. Id. Canon 3(B)(1).
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A judge's appointment of an attorney to a case in an area of law
where the attorney has little or no experience, or to a case which the
attorney cannot handle due to personal or economic concerns, violates
the judge's ethical responsibility to "maintain professional compe-
tence" in the administration of justice. 126 If a court compels an attor-
ney's services, will the judge be subject to disciplinary proceedings or
be jointly responsible for the attorney's malpractice?12 7 Surely if an
attorney is compelled to perform a job he is clearly unqualified to pro-
vide, any liability should not be borne by the attorney alone.
The foregoing discussion does not overlook the importance of pro-
viding competent legal counsel for the protection of constitutional
rights, but rather focuses on the problems of assigning that duty to an
uncompensated element of society. Courts have attempted to assign
civil rights cases, while recognizing ethical and practical concerns.
Courts have assigned such cases only to litigation attorneys (to ensure
that the attorney is able to perform the services needed), or to attor-
neys associated with larger firms (to reduce the economic impact of
the uncompensated case), or to attorneys located near the federal
courts (to lessen the practical problems of time consumed in travel).
Each of these qualifying factors will further diminish the number of
attorneys called upon to protect the constitutional rights of the poor;
as a result a subsection of the practicing bar will carry the load of the
entire bar, and more importantly, of society as a whole.
Constitutional rights and the guarantee of those rights, while cer-
tainly an issue within the practicing bar, is the compelling concern of
society as a whole. The present system of protecting the constitutional
rights of indigents places this obligation on attorneys, not on society.
As Justice Holmes stated:
In general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his
shifting the damages to his neighbor's shoulders. We are in danger of forget-
ting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change.12 8
Placing the practical and economic burdens of protecting constitu-
tional rights upon the practicing bar alone creates not only ethical di-
lemmas but, where service is compelled and uncompensated, the loss
of the attorney's constitutional rights. Further, the rights of the needy
client may be jeopardized. The American Bar Association has recog-
nized that "[w]hen members of the Bar are induced to render legal
services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality of
the service rendered may be lowered, the welfare of the profession
126. Id.
127. Id. Canon 3(B)(3)(a judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary meas-
ures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may
become aware).
128. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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injured and the administration of justice made less efficient." 29
With the rights and concerns of both counsel and client at issue, it
is imperative that Congress and the bar work to solve these problems
by providing compensation for those requesting it. As forecast in the
Model Code, the efforts of individual lawyers to provide free legal serv-
ices "are often not enough to meet the need."130
Lawyers have peculiar responsibilities for the just administration of the law,
and these responsibilities include providing advice and representation for
needy persons. To a degree not always appreciated by the public at large, the
Bar has performed these obligations with zeal and devotion. The Committee
is persuaded, however, that a system of justice that attempts, in mid twentieth
century America, to meet the needs of the financially incapacitated accused
through primary or exclusive reliance on the uncompensated services of coun-
sel will prove unsuccessful and inadequate.... A system of adequate repre-
sentation, therefore, should be structured and financed in a manner reflecting
its public importance.... We believe that fees for private appointed counsel
should be set by the court within maximum limits established by the
statute.
1 31
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal profession has a long history of helpin7g those who cannot
afford to pay. Many attorneys provide this "free" service out of a
sense of commitment to the community, pride in their profession, and
the desire to promote justice. It seems ironic that this long tradition of
providing legal services to indigents has become an "obligation" by
which the federal courts can strip attorneys of their protected rights
and impose upon them ethical dilemmas.
The system of court appointments contradicts common sense
methods for encouraging altruism. Children are not taught to give by
forcing the decision upon them; the forced decision destroys an ele-
ment essential for inculcating a concern for the community: the free-
dom to choose to help others. Children learn to give freely by
experiencing the personal satisfaction of helping, and by recognizing
that this satisfaction outweighs the value of what they gave. Unfortu-
nately, not all members of the legal profession have or will learn this
lesson and, accordingly, payment is necessary to ensure that adequate
help is available to protect the constitutional rights of the needy. But
for those who choose to give their services, the choice of when, how,
and to whom the services are given should remain theirs. Simply
stated, the "basic responsibility for providing legal services for those
unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and per-
129. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 302 (1961).
130. MODEL CODE, supra note 118, EC 2-25.
131. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON POVERTY & THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
CRDMINAL JUSTICE 41-43 (1963).
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sonal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of
the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer."132 The ser-
vice, however, must be based on choice rather than coercion. Reten-
tion of the present system of court appointments will result, not in a
freely made choice of service, but in an obligation of service that is
contrary to the spirit of the Model Rules and Model Code, and cannot
be justified either by the Constitution, or by the title "officer of the
court."
David Zwart '91
132. MODEL CODE, supra note 118, EC 2-25.
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